The hottest treasure is luoshengmen CSG's today an

Baoneng luoshengmen: today of CSG, tomorrow of Vanke

after Vanke, besides Yao yuan, the major shareholder of Taobao addiction in the secondary market where A-goods are rampant, he finally tore his face and met with the management of CSG a

for this result, it is no surprise. With the temperament of Zeng Nan Ganglie, the founder and chairman of CSG, this should happen sooner or later. According to the resolution of the board of directors, Zeng Nan agreed to the interim proposal of replacing the chairman of Baoneng department. After the meeting, he resigned with seven senior executives. Although there was something strange, the result was that the listed company lost a large number of senior executives at once when the major shareholders without manufacturing management background were willing to take over the listed company, and the business failed to transfer and transition smoothly. The final result was that the interests of the listed company were damaged

this article has no intention to investigate the disputes and right and wrong of both parties. The shareholders of the secondary market of listed companies will vote with their feet. What this article wants to discuss more is where the technology flow CSG a will go after such great changes

first, the solid family wealth left by Zeng Nan

the listed companies in the foreign minister of member Yao are basically excellent. CSG a, an old listed company in Shekou, was once on an equal footing with Vanke, China Merchants, Ping An and other famous enterprises in the 1990s. Due to the difference in the development speed between low financial leverage industrial management and high financial leverage financial real estate management, CSG gradually became a younger brother in terms of asset size and market value, but in the industrial sector, CSG is not only an excellent national brand, but also a listed company with excellent business performance. Zeng Nan has been in charge of CSG for 32 years, and has left a solid foundation for CSG with the style of low-key hard work, diligence and responsibility, and advocating technology and innovation

solid family background:

1. A large group listed company with healthy finance and good performance. Judging from the financial report of the third quarter of 2016, the total assets of CSG are 169. 300 million, with a debt ratio of 51. 3%, and the operating income in the third quarter was 65. 200 million, net cash from operating activities 15. 900million, net profit 7. 100 million, gross profit margin 27. 5%, the net profit margin is 11%, and the weighted return on net assets is 9%

2. The world's leading national brand of energy-saving glass and the leading domestic supplier of energy-saving glass. Energy saving glass is the housekeeping business of CSG, and its core business is Taurus. In terms of brand and technology, it can be compared with the world's top two Saint Gobain and Asahi Salter, ranking first in China in terms of production capacity, and accounting for more than 55% of the domestic high-end market. CSG Shuangyin energy-saving glass is the best-selling high-end curtain wall energy-saving glass; There is only one domestic supplier of Sanyin super energy-saving glass with the best energy-saving effect independently developed; It is the only manufacturer in the world that has the ability to equip large-scale low-E coating equipment by itself

3. Ultra thin glass production line with leading technology and ultra-thin glass products with complete categories. Ultra thin glass refers to the thickness of 1. Glass below 1mm, including soda lime ultra-thin glass, Chinalco glass and high alumina glass, is mainly used in the ITO glass market and cover plate protection glass market of electronic products. These types of ultra-thin glass are produced by CSG all-round, and ultra-thin glass has become the core business of CSG. From 0 in 2012. 7mm, to 0. 55mm, up to the current 0. 33mm or even 0. 2mm, technology and yield are advancing step by step. In recent years, CSG's high-performance and cost-effective ultra-thin glass with a complete range of products has won more than half of the domestic market, rewriting the history that imported glass accounts for more than 90% of the market share

4. High end float ultra white glass and solar calendered ultra white glass production lines. As the core product of CSG's differentiated competition, CSG's high-end float ultra white glass and solar calendered ultra white glass have always maintained a high gross profit margin of 30% - 50%, which is one of CSG's core cash cow businesses

5. A float glass production line that can stably supply high-end raw chips and ultra-low energy consumption. CSG's leading position in the energy-saving glass market is inseparable from the stable supply of high-end glass chips. Although these 10 huge float glass production lines are the proud cash cow of CSG in the past, which are closely related to product quality and personal safety, they have become a thin dog business after the market surplus. Nevertheless, the CSG float glass production line is still the market leader in the 33.6% rise in freight rates in the city. All of them adopt the most advanced natural gas combustion method, with the lowest unit gas consumption level in the country. The glass line is still burning coal and heavy oil, and is equipped with waste heat power generation system and photovoltaic power generation system, all of which are green factories. In addition, CSG is also one of the few manufacturers that master float coating technology

6. Integrated solar photovoltaic industry. CSG has 6000 tons of polysilicon capacity, 1GW silicon wafer capacity, 350MW battery module capacity and more than 100MW photovoltaic power stations. Photovoltaic business is a strategic business of CSG, which has been pinned on infinite hope, but the industrial layout and market development rhythm do not match well. Although the products are excellent, there has been no outstanding financial performance, which has dragged down the market value of CSG, resulting in a large part of the market value being opened by Fuyao in recent years

7. The enterprise culture of being diligent and pragmatic and advocating technology, as well as a large number of innovative technical talents. Almost all domestic glass technologies were originally created abroad. Domestic manufacturers have broken through foreign technical barriers bit by bit. CSG is most impressed by the hardships they have paid. The mission of CSG at the beginning was to introduce PPG float glass technology from the United States to the newly established state-owned Guangdong float glass company. In the process of introduction, Mr. Zeng Nan, as a Chinese representative, was despised. After the completion of the task, CSG should be dissolved, Zeng Nan assumed it, and operated the company as the founder (China Merchants Group is still a shareholder). From the beginning of the glass trade to the subsequent various glass production lines, CSG has created countless "leading" histories of domestic glass. Zeng Nan fully implemented the style of leading technology into the enterprise management, and cultivated a large number of domestic top-notch technical talents

second, why the market value performance is not satisfactory in recent years

in recent years, the market value of CSG fluctuated in the range of 100 million, and there was no breakthrough, and the total assets and operating income almost did not grow. For example, the total assets in 2011 was 15.3 billion, at the end of 2015 was only 15.5 billion, and the operating income in 2011 was 82. 700 million, and the operating income fell back to 74 in 2015. 300million. In the same period, Fuyao Glass, a giant of reversing switches that should be liquidated, polished or replaced by new ones for automotive glass (CSG is a giant of architectural glass), increased its total assets from 12.2 billion to 24.8 billion, and its operating income from 96. The market value of Fuyao Glass was as high as 36billion yuan (the market value of Hong Kong shares was 58.2 billion Hong Kong dollars)

a large listed company with convenient financing, its annual capital expenditure is as high as 2 + billion, and it has lost its growth for four consecutive years. It is either the company's long-term strategic layout or the company's operation and management. CSG has been managed by Zeng Nan for 32 years, and its excellent management level is beyond doubt. More than 60 core executives have also remained stable for many years, with almost no loss. With such a stable management team, it is difficult to say what problems have occurred in the company's operation and management. Although equity decentralization is easy to lead to agent problems, there is no obvious sign. The problem mainly lies in the business layout of CSG in the past decade

(taking stock of past mistakes is a bit of a hindsight, because the decision-makers make decisions based on the limited information at that time; the combing here is for reference only, mainly according to the importance rather than the chronological order)

1. Error 1: the photovoltaic industry integration strategy

the photovoltaic industry is a promising sunrise industry, and CSG's diversification strategy here is understandable, Photovoltaic also made CSG reach 14 in 2010. 100million profit peak. However, the truth is that the PV business has lowered the overall gross profit margin of CSG, from more than 40% to the current 27%. The losses of PV in recent years have also made it difficult for CSG to restore its former profitability

the photovoltaic integration strategy is the reason why CSG is difficult to get out of the mire in the near future. Almost all the mainstream players who adopted this strategy in those years fell into trouble, such as Suntech, Yingli, Saiwei and Yuhui, and almost all fell into polysilicon. Photovoltaic companies that focus on a certain link of the industrial chain have now won a new era. In the early era of owning silicon as the king, CSG started with polycrystalline silicon. The polycrystalline silicon plant was located in Yichang for the sake of extremely cheap and preferential water and electricity prices. As a result, it was trapped. After it was put into operation, the electricity price was as high as more than 60 cents, which directly made CSG polycrystalline silicon lose its competitiveness. In 2006, the cooperation with Suntech was not negotiated (CSG made silicon materials and Suntech made battery components), so CSG decided to make battery components by itself, and then even the silicon wafer production capacity with lower gross profit rate was launched. This huge industrial chain investment did not make CSG a mainstream player, but a little marginalized, because the business scale of each link was not enough to enter the forefront. Photovoltaic business is a heavy asset business. When a large amount of funds are invested in photovoltaic capacity, as the superstar business of CSG - energy-saving glass business, there can be no more funds to consolidate its core competitiveness, and low-end energy-saving glass manufacturers such as Xinyi Glass gradually encroach on CSG's original mid-range market

2. Error 2: solar ultra white glass failed to seize the opportunity

as the first enterprise to establish the leading edge of solar ultra white glass in China, CSG was optimistic about the market prospect, but in terms of layout, it was not only slow, but also did not step on the pace, and did not build Taiyang ultra white glass as an enterprise star product in time, which eventually lost market opportunities and did not achieve hegemony

after CSG established two production lines in Dongguan, South China, its production and sales were booming, but it did not expand its production in Suzhou, East China in time. When the river source in South China continued to expand production, due to land problems, it was finally transferred to Suzhou in East China to expand production. The time was wasted for three years. When it was planning to continue to expand production in Dongguan, South China, it encountered a low tide in the market, and the old line lost money. It could only stop the old line at a very high cost and put a new production line next to it. While CSG missed the market opportunity, competitors such as Xinyi and fulette seized the opportunity to significantly expand production and occupy the market with production capacity. Although CSG has advantages in original film technology, AR coating technology and tempering technology, it can only retreat to the third place in terms of scale

3. Other mistakes

as the core business and star business of CSG, energy-saving glass did not pay attention to defense, so that the enterprising little brother Xinyi Glass, starting from the low-end single silver Low-E glass, gradually eroded CSG's share of double silver Low-E glass. In addition to energy-saving glass, CSG has sent two assists about artificial skin God to Xinyi Glass. One is that CSG sold its car glass to the other party, withdrew from the car glass market, lost the opportunity to track the highest value glass for a long time, and strengthened its opponents. The other is that, as mentioned above, it left a gap for solar ultra white glass, allowing Xinyi Glass to rise to the top. At present, Xinyi Glass has become the most powerful competitor of CSG, and competes with CSG in various fields such as float glass, energy-saving glass, solar ultra white glass and coated glass

the withdrawal of corner materials such as curtain wall glass, fine ceramics, TCO glass and sapphire will not affect the overall situation, which is not shown here. It is worth mentioning that the fine glass business of CSG started earlier than that of orfig and Laibao. However, by betting on the ITO film business, orfig started rapidly and grew into a listed company with a market capitalization higher than that of CSG, which makes people sigh. The loss of opportunities also led to the failure of the spin off and listing plan of CSG's fine glass business for many years

III. market opportunities and CSG price